When the 9.0-magnitude earthquake struck at 2:46 p.m. local time, the plant’s reactors automatically shut down, stopping nuclear fission. However, the plant still required external power to operate cooling systems and prevent reactor cores from overheating. The loss of power triggered emergency diesel generators, but three of them were placed at lower elevations, making them vulnerable. Less than an hour later, a tsunami measuring more than 14 meters (46 feet) in height struck the facility. The plant’s seawall, built to withstand a 5.7-meter (19-foot) wave, was insufficient. Water flooded the site, submerging backup generators located in the basements, rendering them inoperable. With no power to circulate coolant, the reactor cores began overheating. Over the next several days, hydrogen explosions damaged three reactor buildings, and radiation was released into the environment. Emergency responders, later called the “Fukushima 50” for their efforts to contain the disaster, worked under dangerous conditions as the situation worsened. Evacuation zones were expanded amid rising concerns about contamination. Despite emergency measures, radiation continued to spread into the air, soil and the Pacific Ocean, triggering one of the most severe environmental crises in modern history. Prior to the disaster, multiple studies warned that a major tsunami could surpass the plant’s defenses. In 2008, a government report recommended reassessing tsunami risks, warning that the existing seawall could be inadequate. TEPCO did not act on these recommendations. Katsuhiko Ishibashi, a seismologist and professor emeritus at Kobe University, said the risks had been known for years.

"If Japan had faced up to the dangers earlier, we could have prevented Fukushima."

Investigations revealed that TEPCO was also aware that backup generators were vulnerable to flooding but did not relocate them or install waterproof barriers. Even after the tsunami struck, TEPCO hesitated to use seawater to cool the reactors, fearing that it would make the units permanently inoperable. Later, the company acknowledged its lack of preparedness in an internal reform plan:

"When looking back on the accident, the problem was that preparations were not made in advance."

The disaster forced the evacuation of approximately 160,000 people, many of whom have not returned due to radiation concerns and economic challenges. Areas marked as “difficult-to-return zones” remain uninhabitable. While no deaths were directly linked to radiation exposure, studies indicate that stress-related illnesses, depression and suicide rates increased among evacuees. Takashi Onishi, president of the Science Council of Japan, later stated:

"The myth of absolute safety has dominated the policies of this country and prevented us from applying additional improvements to our nuclear power plants."

The disaster also disrupted agriculture and fishing industries in Fukushima Prefecture. Concerns over contamination led to a drop in demand for local produce and seafood. The Japanese government has since spent billions of dollars on decontamination efforts and compensation payments.

The Fukushima disaster prompted a global reassessment of nuclear energy policies:

• Germany committed to shutting down all nuclear power plants by 2022.

• Italy and Switzerland halted new nuclear energy projects.

• Japan temporarily shut down all 54 nuclear reactors for safety reviews, increasing reliance on fossil fuels and renewable energy.

In response to Fukushima, nuclear safety regulations were strengthened worldwide. Japan overhauled its regulatory agencies, creating independent oversight bodies to enforce stricter safety measures. The Fukushima Daiichi disaster was not solely the result of natural events but a failure of risk management and regulatory enforcement. Experts contend that if TEPCO had implemented recommended safety improvements, such as reinforcing the seawall and relocating generators, the worst of the disaster could have been avoided. The event serves as a reminder that nuclear safety depends not just on technology, but on human decision-making. As nations debate the future of nuclear energy, Fukushima stands as both a cautionary tale and a lesson in accountability.

The Fukushima Daiichi disaster exposed critical vulnerabilities in nuclear safety, many of which experts warn still exist today. While regulatory changes and technological advancements have improved plant safety, risks remain. Aging infrastructure, underestimation of natural disasters, inadequate emergency preparedness, and economic pressures could contribute to future nuclear accidents if safety measures are not continually reassessed and reinforced. Fukushima demonstrated that a nuclear crisis is not solely the result of technological failure but more so of corporate decision-making. Experts stress the need for ongoing risk assessment, stronger regulatory oversight, and greater transparency to prevent similar incidents. As nuclear energy continues to play a role in global energy production, ensuring robust safety measures will be essential to minimizing future risks.

Without fundamental changes in oversight and disaster preparedness, experts warn that similar failures could happen again—with even more severe consequences.

TOKYO—On March 11, 2011, a catastrophic failure occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan after a powerful earthquake and tsunami struck the region. The disaster led to reactor explosions, radiation leaks into the air and ocean, and the evacuation of thousands of residents. The crisis emphasized the risks of nuclear energy and, according to experts, could have been prevented.

More than a decade later, Fukushima remains a focal point for discussions on corporate responsibility, regulatory oversight and nuclear safety. Investigators and scientists have said that Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) ignored safety recommendations for years, failing to prepare for a disaster of this magnitude. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, chairman of Japan’s National Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, later described the event as:

"A profoundly man-made disaster—that could and should have been foreseen and prevented."

As the world reevaluates the role of nuclear energy, the Fukushima disaster raises critical questions: What led to the failures at the plant, and what could have been done to prevent them?